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This paper undertakes a discussion of the Sisyphus fragment and Critias of
Athens, examining the question of authorship and arguing that, ultimately, the attribution
to Critias is more important than whether or not his authorship of the fragment is
historical fact, though it is also likely that he did indeed write it. The attribution to Critias
is supported by the consistencies between the views present in the fragment and Critias’
character and actions as reported by contemporaries and later biographers. Moreover,
those views are a natural extension of pre-Socratic thought and share some
commonalities with Plato’s own philosophy; by establishing the philosophical context of
the fragment, this paper cements Critias’ relevancy as a philosopher, not just a ruthless
politician.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background
The first known theory of religion as a mechanism of social control,1 and perhaps
the first truly atheistic text in Western thought, 2 the Sisyphus fragment’s forty-two lines
of iambic trimeter are teeming with ideas of historical and philosophical significance.
Though the fragment’s authorship is uncertain, it likely dates to the fifth century B.C.E.
Unfortunately, our only sources for the fragment are two second-century C.E. authors,
and they hardly provide a wealth of information.3 Sextus Empiricus cites forty-two lines
and attributes them to the tyrant Critias;4 Aëtius quotes only four lines but attributes them
to Euripides.5 In this fragment, the speaker explains that religion is a human invention
intended to keep people in check with the ever-present threat of divine retribution for any
wrongdoing, no matter how secret. This idea, that the gods are a fabrication and religion
merely a useful tool invented by some superior man to keep the masses in check, may

1

William K.C. Guthrie, The Sophists (Cambridge: University Press, 1971), 244; Tim Whitmarsh, “Atheistic
Aesthetics: The Sisyphus Fragment, Poetics and the Creativity of Drama,” Proceedings of the Cambridge
Philological Society 60 (2014): 109.
2
Pieter W. Van der Horst, “The First Atheist,” in Jews and Christians in their Greco-Roman Contexts
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006), 242.
3
Whitmarsh (2014): 109-10.
4
Adv. Math. 9.54
5
Plac. 1.7.2 = [Plut.] Mor. 880e-f
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seem like a modern invention, calling to mind the likes of Marx6 and Nietzsche,7 for
instance, but it existed at least as early as this fragment and was, in fact, a natural
extension of even earlier philosophies. I have provided the Greek text of the fragment
below, followed by my own translation of it into English.

1.2 Greek Text8
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h]n xro/noj, o3t’ h]n a!taktoj a)nqrw&pwn bi/oj
kai\ qhriw&dhj i0sxu/oj q’ u9phre/thj,
o3t’ ou0de\n a}qlon ou1te toi=j e0sqloi=sin h]n
ou1t’ au] ko/lasma toi=j kakoi=j e0gi/gneto.
ka!peita& moi dokou=sin a!nqrwpoi no/mouj
qe/sqai kolasta&j, i3na di/kh tu/rannoj h|]
<o9mw~j a(pa&ntwn> th/n q’ u3brin dou/lhn e1xh|,
e0zhmiou=to d’ ei1 tij e0camarta&noi.
e1peit’ e0peidh\ ta)mfanh= me\n oi9 no/moi
a)pei=rgon au0tou\j e1rga mh\ pra&ssein bi/a|,
la&qra| d’ e1prasson, thnikau=ta& moi dokei=
<prw~ton> pukno/j tij kai\ sofo\j gnw&mhn a)nh/r
<qew~n> de/oj qnhtoi=sin e0ceurei=n, o3pwj
ei1h ti dei=ma toi=j kakoi=si, ka@n la&qra|
pra&sswsin h2 le/gwsin h2 fronw~si/ <ti>.
e0nteu=qen ou]n to\ qei=on ei0shgh/sato,
w(j e1sti dai/mwn a)fqi/tw| qa&llwn bi/w|,
no/w| t’ a)kou/wn kai\ ble/pwn, fronw~n t’ a!gan
prose/xwn te tau=ta, kai\ fu/sin qei/an forw~n,
o4j pa~n to\ lexqe\n e0n brotoi=j a)kou/setai,
<to\> drw&menon de\ pa~n i0dei=n dunh/setai.
e0a_n de\ su\n sigh|= ti bouleu/h|j kako/n,
tou=t’ ou0xi\ lh/sei tou\j qeou\j: to\ ga_r fronou=n
<a!gan> e1nesti. tou/sde tou/j lo/gouj le/gwn
didagma&twn h3diston ei0shgh/sato
yeudei= kalu/yaj th\n a)lh/qeian lo/gw|.
nai/en d’ e1fraske tou\j qeou\j e0ntau=q’, i3na

6

“Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie,” MEW Bd. 1, 378: “Die Religion ist…ihre moralische
Sanktion” (“Religion is [the world’s] moral sanction”).
7
See Nietzsche’s concept of the Übermensch, who is above the morality of the masses.
8
DK 88 B25 [=TrGf fr. 19].
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ma&list’ a@n e0ce/plhcen a)nqrw&pouj le/gwn,
o3qen per e1gnw tou\j fo/bouj o1ntaj brotoi=j
kai\ ta_j o0nh/seij tw|~ talaipw&rw| bi/w|,
e0k th=j u3perqe perifora~j, i3n’ a)strapa&j
katei/den ou1saj, deina_ de\ ktuph/mata
bronth=j, to/ t’ a)sterwpo\n ou0ranou= de/maj,
Xro/nou kalo\n poi/kilma te/ktonoj sofou=,
o3qen te lampro\j a)ste/roj stei/xei mu/droj
o3 q’ u9gro\j ei0j gh=n o1mbroj e0kporeu/etai.
toi/ouj de\ perie/sthsen a)nqrw~poij fo/bouj,
di’ ou4j kalw~j te tw~| lo/gw| katw|&kisen
to\n dai/mon(a) ou[<toj> ka)n pre/ponti xwri/w|,
th\n a)nomi/an te toi=j fo/boij kate/sbesen.
ou3tw de\ prw~ton oi1omai pei=sai/ tina
qnhtou\j nomi/zein daimo/nwn ei]nai ge/noj.

1.3 English Translation9
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There was a time when the life of men was unordered
and bestial, a servant of strength,
when there was no prize for good men,
nor in turn was there chastisement for evil ones.
And then men seem to me to have established laws
as punishers, so that Justice might be a tyrant
<of everything altogether> and have violence as her slave,
and if anyone did wrong, he was punished.
Then, when the laws hindered them from openly
doing deeds through violence,
and they began to do [them] secretly, it seems to me that
at that time some shrewd man wise in judgment <first>
invented fear <of the gods> for mortals, so that
there might be some fear for evil men, even secretly
doing or saying or thinking <anything>.
Henceforth, then, he introduced the divine, [saying]
that there is a divine power flourishing with immortal life,
hearing and seeing with his mind, thinking very much and
being intent on these things, and possessing a divine nature,
[one] who hears everything spoken among mortals,
and will be able to see everything being done.
Even if you plan some evil [deed] in secret,
this will not escape the notice of the gods; for thought

All translations, including this one, are my own, unless otherwise indicated.
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is <wholly> in [them]. Telling these stories,
he introduced the sweetest of doctrines,
having covered the truth with a false story.
And he said that the gods dwell there, so that, speaking,
he could especially astound men, [in that place]
from where he knew that mortals’ fears come,
and good fortune for the miserable life,
from the vault [of heaven] above, where he saw there are
flashes of lightning and terrible crashes
of thunder, and the starry frame of heaven,
the beautiful embroidery of Chronos its wise craftsman,
from where the radiant red-hot mass of a star comes,
and the rainy thunderstorm goes forth onto the earth.
And he brought round these fears for men,
through these [stories] he established the divine power
in a fitting place with his speech,
and he extinguished disorder with fears.
Thus I think that someone first persuaded
mortals to think that there is a race of divinities.

1.4 Objective
I propose to examine the Sisyphus fragment as an explanation of the origins of
religion, which through its treatment of cult reveals the writer’s ideas about human nature
and the political order. Who that author is remains uncertain. Though the fragment’s
attribution to Critias has been less accepted recently than the attribution to Euripides,10 I
reconsider the evidence that points to Critias as the author and argue that what really
matters is that, even if he himself did not write it, the attribution to him indicates that the
ancients must have considered it to be a fitting characterization of his beliefs and actions
as a member of the Thirty Tyrants. In other words, it is the sort of thing he might have
written, and as such the fragment should be interpreted as a programmatic rationale for
10

See Charles H. Khan, “Greek Religion and Philosophy in the Sisyphus Fragment,” Phronesis 42, no. 3
(1997): 249. He states that Dihle’s argument for Euripidean attribution “has been widely and rightly
accepted.”
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the public policies and violent actions Critias infamously led the Thirty in enacting.
Drawing upon Xenophon, Plato, and Critias’ own poetry, I then explore the character of
this complex and sophisticated Athenian. I argue that, despite the contradictory portrayals
here, the views presented in the Sisyphus fragment are informed by a number of other
sources, in particular Solon’s political order of eunomia, Thucydides’ assertion that the
final step in revolution is the misuse of language, and Plato’s conception of the power of
poetry and his own “noble lie,” which he deems necessary for a just society, just as
Critias deems religion necessary for law and order to prevail over human nature.

5

CHAPTER II
THE QUESTION OF AUTHORHSHIP

Regarding the question of authorship, Sextus Empiricus, in his citation of the
fragment, attributes it to Critias.11 That would date the fragment to the fifth century
B.C.E.; since Sextus Empiricus was writing over half a millennium later, his attribution is
itself likely the result of a pre-existing tradition of Critias as the author. Other sources,
however, namely the doxography of Aëtius,12 have claimed this as a fragment of
Euripides. This attribution still puts the fragment in the fifth century; thus, regardless of
which man wrote it, it can be understood as a product of fifth-century Athenian thought.
The most apparent link between Critias and the fragment is atheism. As I
mentioned in the beginning, this fragment is one of the first, if not the first, written
expressions of atheistic ideas in Western thought. Critias appears on several lists of
atheists.13 Obviously, this alone is not enough to establish authorship, as it is rather
circular to say that we know Critias wrote the fragment because he was an atheist, which
we know because of the fragment he wrote. Sextus Empiricus’ introduction of the

11

Adv. Math. 9.54.
Plac. 1.7.2 = [Plut.] Mor. 880e-f
13
See for example Sextus Empiricus P.H. 3.218; Plut. De superst. 171c. According to Phil. Piet. 2.106
[=Obbink 1.19.5], Epicurus criticized Critias for his atheism in De Natura; ca. 4th-3rd c. B.C.E., Epicurus’
would be the earliest such list of atheists, as per David Sedley, “The Atheist Underground,” Politeia in
Greek and Roman Philosophy, ed. Verity Harte (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 329.
12
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fragment says that “Critias, one of the tyrants in Athens, seems to be among the company
of atheists since he says that the ancient lawgivers…made up god” (kai\ Kriti/aj de\ ei[j
tw~n e0n 0Aqh/naij turannhsa&ntwn dokei= e0k tou= ta&gmatoj tw~n a)qe/wn u9pa&rxein
fa&menoj, o3ti oi9 palaioi/ nomoqe/tai…e1plasan to\n qeo\n);14 this seems to suggest that
the attribution was made based on a pre-existing tradition of Critias as the author. The
assertion that Critias was an atheist would, therefore, have then followed based on the
atheistic content of the fragment. It is thus likely that Sextus Empiricus put Critias on his
list of atheists because of the Sisyphus fragment, rather than attributed it to him because
of his place on the list of atheists. That the fragment was known as a work of Critias in
antiquity and incidentally provided an example of his atheism is indeed stronger evidence
for his authorship than a link between the man and the fragment based only on their
shared atheism.
Because of Critias’ reputation for atheism and Sextus Empiricus’ attribution, the
prevailing thought for a long time was that Critias was the author, and he was indeed the
sort of man who would have been interested in and quite capable of producing such a
piece of literature. I will come back to that later. As I mentioned before, Aëtius quotes
four lines of the fragment and attributes them to Euripides, claiming that the playwright
“was not willing to speak his mind, because he feared the Areopagus; but he let [his
opinion] be seen in this way: he introduced Sisyphus, champion of this opinion, to be an
advocate for his thought” (a)pokalu/yasqai me\n ou0k h0qe/lhse, dedoikw_j to_n 0Areion
pa/gon: e0ne/fhne de\ tou=ton to_n tro/pon to_n ga_r Si/sufon ei0sh/gage prosta&thn

14

Adv. Math. 9.54.
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tau/thj th=j do/chj kai\ sunhgo/rhsen au0tou= tau/th| th=| gnw&mh|).15 It seems that
Euripides’ association with atheism is what connects him to the fragment—he had the
reputation of being the poet of the Sophists, and there was enough of a link between
atheism and Euripides that Aristophanes has a character claim that Euripides “has
persuaded the men that gods do not exist” with his tragedies (nu=n d’ ou[toj e0n tai=sin
tragw|di/aij poiw~n / tou\j a!ndraj a)nape/peiken ou0k ei]nai qeou/j).16 Because
Euripides is also linked to atheism, Critias cannot be assumed to be the author based only
on his own reputation as an atheist; this is why it is important that Sextus Empiricus
seems to assert that Critias is the author apart from that connection. On the other hand,
Euripides did actually write a satyr-play called Sisyphus to accompany his Trojan trilogy
(i.e., Alexander, Palamedes, and The Trojan Women) of 415 B.C.E.17 That could be
interpreted as damning evidence against the case for Critias as author, but given that
Aeschylus, too, had at least one (maybe two) satyr plays featuring Sisyphus, and
Euripides himself had another, it is not so difficult to believe that Critias might also have
penned a satyr play involving Sisyphus, which later became confused with the Sisyphus
play(s) by the more famous playwright Euripides.18
Nevertheless, Aëtius’ attribution and the fact that Euripides is known to have
written a Sisyphus satyr-play have led many to accept Euripides as the author.19 That may
be so, though I agree with Whitmarsh that “the hypothesis that the play was originally
15

Plac. 1.7.2 = [Plut.] Mor. 880e-f
Thesmophoriazusae 450-51
17
Khan (1997): 249; Martin Cropp, “Lost Tragedies: A Survey” in A Companion to Greek Tragedy, ed.
Justina Gregory (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), 287.
18
Whitmarsh (2014): 111-12; Patrick O’Sullivan, “Sophistic Ethics, Old Atheism, and “Critias” on Religion,”
Classical World 105, no. 2 (2012): 168; Cropp (2005), 287.
19
See for example Albrecht Dihle, “Das Satyrspiel ‘Sisyphos,’” Hermes 105 (1977): 28-42; also Khan (1997).
16
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attributed to Critias and subsequently reallocated to the more famous Euripides (who
already had a reputation for atheism) seems prima facie more plausible than the
reverse.”20 But, for the sake of argument, suppose for now that Euripides is the author of
the Sisyphus fragment. If that is the case, then why did the ancients (and many modern
scholars) decide that it was the work of Critias instead? Because it exemplifies his
character. In other words, even if Critias himself did not write the Sisyphus fragment, it
must be so consistent with who he was that he might as well have, and therefore we can
talk about the two alongside each other.

20

Whitmarsh (2014): 112
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CHAPTER III
CRITIAS OF ATHENS

3.1 Xenophon and the Biographers
Who, then, was Critias? I’ve said already that he was the sort of man who would
have been capable of and interested in writing something like the Sisyphus fragment.
Born ca. 460 B.C.E.21 into an aristocratic family descended from Solon’s brother
Dropides—the same family that would eventually produce Plato (see figure 3.1)—Critias
was wealthy and very well-educated (a!rista…h]n pepaideume/noj)22 and thus heavily
involved in philosophy, politics, and literature. Among his “large and diverse” body of
literary endeavors are two separate sets of Republics, both fragmentary; poetry on
Anacreon;23 a critical response to Archilochus’ poetry; 24 and possibly three tragedies
(these have also been attributed to Euripides).25 Critias was also steeped in the
philosophical conversations of his day, not least because philosophy and politics were
deeply intertwined in fifth-century Athens.26 He followed Socrates for some time but
ultimately abandoned his teachings to pursue political power, which he went about doing
21

Michael Gagarin, “Critias,” The Oxford Classical Dictionary, 4th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2012): 394.
22
Philostratus, Vitae sophistrarum 1.16.
23
DK 88 B 1
24
DK 88 B 44
25
Guthrie (1971): 302-03.
26
Ibid., 304.
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in a sophistic way, with little regard for the morality of his actions or rhetoric so long as
they furthered his ends.27 Critias’ political involvement in Athens is first recorded in 415
B.C.E., when he was implicated as one of the Herm-mutilators alongside Alcibiades,28
and, of course, reaches its apex in the coup of 404 and reign of the Thirty Tyrants, of
whom he was the foremost in power and ruthlessness until he was killed in 403.29

Solon

Dropides
Critias
Callaeschrus
Glaucon

Critias
Charmides

Perictione

Ariston
Plato

Figure 3.1
Family Tree of Critias, According to Diogenes Laërtius30

Xenophon, an historian and contemporary of Critias, has a superlatively negative
view of the tyrant. He reports that he “was the most greedy and violent of all [the
oligarchs]” (Kriti/aj…pa&ntwn pleonekti/statoj te kai\ biaio/tatoj e0ge/neto).31
Moreover, Critias and Alcibiades, Xenophon argues, associated with Socrates only out of
27

Ibid., 298.
Guthrie (1971): 301; see also Andocides, De Mysteriis 1.47.
29
Tim Whitmarsh, Battling the Gods: Atheism in the Ancient World (New York: Vintage Books, 2015), 94;
Guthrie (1971): 301.
30
Vitae phil. 3.1.
31
Memorabilia 1.2.12.
28
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a desire to learn how to argue effectively, not because they ever wanted to imitate his
moderate lifestyle.32 In support of this is their abandonment of Socrates to seek political
power as soon as they thought they had learned enough from him, as well as their
eagerness to seek out conversation with prominent politicians even while they were still
followers of Socrates.33 Socrates’ ability to persuade his interlocutors of whatever he
wished would be a useful skill indeed for two such as these who wanted “to govern
everything by themselves and be most famous of all” (boulome/nw te pa&nta di’
e9autwn pra&ttesqai kai\ pa&ntwn o0nomastota&tw gene/sqai),34 whereas Socrates’ life
of simplicity is diametrically opposed to that objective; Xenophon’s conclusion that “they
would rather have died” (e9le/sqai a@n ma~llon au0tw_ teqna&nai) than follow the example
of their once-mentor may be hyperbolic, but it is not inconsistent with the description of
these men that Xenophon lays out.35 To be sure, Xenophon’s Critias was not a moderate
man either in the public sphere (see the below discussion of the Hellenica for his lack of
restraint as a tyrant) or the private. Socrates reportedly criticized this private lack of
restraint:
“When he perceived that Critias yearned for Euthydemus, desiring and
making an attempt on him…he dissuaded him…but when Critias did not
listen to these things or desist, it is said that Socrates…said that Critias

32

Ibid., 1.2.15.
Ibid., 1.2.16.; 1.2.39.
34
Ibid., 1.2.14.
35
Ibid., 1.2.16.
33
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seems to have the mind of a pig, lusting after Euthydemus just as pigs rut
against stones.”36
Beyond providing an unflattering assessment of Critias’ moral character, this account
suggests that Critias was not inclined to listen to Socrates’ advice concerning virtue,
reinforcing Xenophon’s hypothesis that he only followed the man to learn the art of
argument from him.
Xenophon gives a more detailed account of Critias’ tyranny in the Hellenica.
Perhaps the most salient tale is of his disagreement with Theramenes, another member of
the Thirty who opposed Critias’ readiness to kill those whom he perceived as having
wronged him (e0pei\ de\ au0to\j me\n propeth\j h]n e0pi\ to\ pollou\j a)poktei/nein…
Qhrame/nhj a)nte/kopte).37 When Critias then aimed that readiness to kill at Theramenes
and gave a speech to the Council in favor of putting his ally-turned-opponent to death,38
Theramenes won the Council over with his own speech.39 But Critias was loathe to let
this threat to his power live (gnou/j o9 Kriti/aj o3ti ei0 e0pitre/yoi th=| boulh=|
diayhfi/zesqai peri\ au0tou=, a)nafeu/coito, kai\ tou=to ou0 biwto\n h9ghsa&menoj), so he
circumvented the authority of the Council, calling in assassins to put Theramenes to death
anyway.40 Before his death, Theramenes, standing atop an altar, asks for justice41 and
says, “By the gods, I am not unaware that this altar here will avail me nothing, but I want
36

Ibid., 1.2.29-30. “Kriti/an me\n toi/nun ai0sqano/menoj e0rw~nta Eu0qudh/mou kai\ peirw~nta
xrh=sqai…a)pe//trepe…tou= de\ Kriti/ou toi=j toioutoi=j ou0x u9pakou/ontoj ou0de\ a0potrepome/nou,
le/getai to\n Swkra/thn…ei0pei=n o3ti u9iko\n au0tw~| dokoi/h pa&sxein o9 Kriti/aj, e0piqumw~n Eu0qudh/mw|
prosknh=sqai w#sper ta_ u3dia toi=j li/qoij.”
37
Xenophon, Hellenica 2.3.15.
38
Ibid., 2.3.24-34
39
Ibid., 2.3.35-50
40
Ibid., 2.3.50.
41
Ibid., 2.3.52.
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to demonstrate that these men42 are not only most unjust to human beings, but also most
impious to the gods” (kai\ tou=to me\n, e1fh, ma_ tou\j qeou\j ou0k a)gnow~, o3ti ou0de/n moi
a0rke/sei o3de o9 bwmo/j, a)lla_ bou/lomai kai\ tou=to e0pidei=cai, o3ti ou[toi ou0 mo/non ei0si\
peri\ a)nqrw&pouj a)dikw&tatoi, a)lla_ kai\ peri\ qeou\j a)sebe/statoi).43 The word I
translated as “impious” there, a)sebh/j, can also be translated as “godless.”44 This does
not guarantee that Theramenes (or Xenophon through Theramenes) was accusing Critias
of being an atheist. What it does mean is that Critias was perceived by his own
contemporaries as having no reverence for the divine, and this is important because it
suggests that he ended up on lists of atheists not merely as a way to discredit him and his
ideology, but as a result of the sacrilegious actions he took.
Xenophon’s description of Critias leaves the impression of a man who cares
nothing for the gods and is consumed with the acquisition and maintenance of power at
any cost, a man whose restraint while a student of Socrates is not at all a credit to his own
character but rather wholly due to the virtue of the philosopher he spent his time with. As
Xenophon greatly admired Socrates and blamed Critias for his death, his account should
be taken with a grain of salt. That being said, it is probably more true than not, since his
initial audience would have likely witnessed or been involved in much of what he writes
about.
Far more removed from these events, and therefore having less of a personal stake
in discrediting Critias, is the second-to-third century C.E. biographer Philostratus. He
warns that Critias cannot be considered evil just because he “destroyed the democracy of
42

i.e., Critias and the rest of the Thirty
Xenophon, Hell. 2.3.53.
44
LS, s.v. “a)sebh/j.”
43
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Athens” (ei0 me\n kate/luse to\n 0Aqhnai/wn dh=mon, ou1pw kako/j), since the democracy,
as stirred up (e0phrme/noj) as it had become, likely would have destroyed itself anyway.45
Nevertheless, because Critias’ crimes go far beyond being anti-democratic,46 Philostratus,
like Xenophon, calls him the “worst” of all infamous evildoers (ka&kistoj a0nqrw&pwn
e1moige fai/netai cumpa&ntwn, w{n e0pi\ kaki/a| o1noma).47 There is additionally an
implication of impiety—as with Theramenes’ accusation in Xenophon, calling this a
charge of atheism might be a stretch, but it certainly is a comment on Critias’ lack of
reverence for the divine—in his accusation that Critias “betrayed the temples [to the
enemy]” (prou0di/dou de\ ta_ i9era&).48 On the other hand, Philostratus does recognize
Critias as a well-educated and rhetorically-skilled man even as he denounces him for his
atrocities; indeed, for Philostratus, this recognition is crucial to his criticism of the tyrant,
making Critias’ crimes all the more heinous because he should have known better by
virtue of his education and especially his association with Socrates.49 Instead, Critias used
his rhetorical abilities for his own gain when, for instance, he “corrupted the Thessalians”
(Kriti/aj…ei1h Qettalou\j diefqorw_j) and “made the oligarchies more oppressive”
(barute/raj d’ au0toi=j e0poi/ei ta_j o0ligarxi/aj) to the people there in order to spark a
revolution and increase his own power.50

45
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Ibid. Among Philostratus’ litany of further accusations are that Critias not only betrayed Athens to
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Ibid.
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Philostratus’ disapproval of how Critias used his rhetoric does not prevent him
from praising its style, which he likens to rays of sunlight (a)kti/nwn au0gai\) shining
through his speeches51 and calls “sweet and smooth, like the breeze of the west wind”
(h9du\ de\ kai\ lei=on, w#sper tou= Zefu/rou h9 au1ra).52 Had Critias put on a show of his
rhetorical talent, he writes, the Thessalians “would have turned to writing like Critias53”
(mete/balon d’ a@n kai\ e0j to\ kritia&zein) instead of Gorgias, who was one of the most
influential rhetoricians of the age.54 That is high praise indeed. The Critias of Philostratus
is therefore just as violent, impious, and ambitious as Xenophon’s, but far more
persuasive55 and explicitly more talented.

3.2 Critias’ Own Works
As I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, Critias was quite a prolific author,
having written political elegies, hexameter in praise of Anacreon, tragedies and the
Sisyphus fragment (possibly), Aphorisms and Homilies (both prose works), and prefaces
to assembly speeches.56 What has survived is only fragmentary. The Critias that comes
through in his own works—leaving aside the Sisyphus fragment for now—is sometimes
difficult to reconcile with the bloodthirsty tyrant depicted by Xenophon and Philostratus.
Much of what he said could hardly have been more at odds with what he purportedly
51

Vitae sophistarum 1.16. This is in reference to Critias’ moderate use of Atticisms, which Philostratus
views as far preferable to the “barbarous” practice overabundant or inappropriate Atticizing.
52
Ibid.
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literally, “Critias-izing”
54
Vitae sophistarum 1.16.
55
Recall that Xenophon’s Critias failed to convince the Council to kill Theramenes and instead had to
circumvent their authority; Philostratus’ Critias persuades the Thessalian oligarchs to become more
oppressive so he could get the revolution he wanted.
56
Albin Lesky, A History of Greek Literature, trans. James Willis and Cornelis de Heer (Indianapolis:
Hackett, 1996), 358.
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did.57 For example, Critias seems to think that moderation and patience are admirable
qualities when he quotes a Spartan, Chilon, and calls him wise for saying, “nothing in
excess; everything good is added in due time” (h]n Lakedaimo/nioj Xi/lwn sofo/j, o4j
ta/d’ e1lece: / “mhde\n a!gan: kairw~i pa&nta pro/sesti kala&”).58 “Patient” and
“moderate” are two of the least apt descriptors one could apply to the historical
depictions of Critias recounted above. Lust and violence, on the other hand, which
seemed ever-present companions of Xenophon’s and Philostratus’ Critias, are now
shameful.59 In another fragment, Critias cautions people against treating friends in a
manner that benefits only themselves, because doing so turns friends into enemies. 60 That
is exactly the opposite of how Critias actually dealt with his former ally Theramenes
(though, to be fair, he did not let him live to be his enemy for very long).
There are nevertheless identifiable pieces of the Critias depicted by others in his
own works. One such point of agreement is Critias’ admiration for the Spartans. He wrote
both poetry and prose about the Spartan way of life,61 praising their moderation in
drinking,62 their fitness,63 and their superior shoes, cloaks, and mugs.64 I pointed out
previously that Philostratus viewed Critias as an accomplished and persuasive speaker; in

57

cf. Phil. Vitae sophistarum 1.16, “ei0 ga_r mh\ o9mologh/sei o9 lo/goj tw~| h1qei, a)llatori/a| th=| glw&tth|
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a fragment from his elegies, Critias claims to have gotten the motion to bring Alcibiades
back from exile passed.65 A sort of aristocratic snobbishness in keeping with Critias’
pedigree is evident in his criticism of Archilochus’ verse, not for any stylistic
shortcomings, but rather for revealing its author’s low birth and descent into poverty. 66
Finally, a fragment from Pirithous67 notes the ease with which a skilled orator can twist
the law.68 The implication that laws are subject to “the able individual,”69 rather than the
other way around, is in keeping with Critias’ own upheaval of Athenian government and
will be relevant again in the upcoming discussion of the Sisyphus fragment itself.

3.3 Plato’s Dialogues
Much like over the authorship of the Sisyphus fragment, there is disagreement
among scholars over who the Critias in Plato’s dialogues is meant to be. Is this Critias the
tyrant, or his homonymous grandfather?70 Critias is introduced in the Protagoras as the
son of Callaeschrus and enters the scene alongside Alcibiades;71 one can hardly take this
Critias to be any other than the tyrant of the late fifth-century, despite his sensible—
moderate, even—recommendation later in the dialogue that no one be too hasty to
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in Plut. Alc. 33.1: gnw&mh d’ h3 se kath/gag’, e0gw_ tau/thn e0n a!pasin / ei]pon, kai\ gra&yaj tou]rgon
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support either Socrates or Protagoras until their debate is concluded.72 In the Charmides,
Critias is again referred to as the son of Callaeschrus73 and goes on to mention his
relation to Glaucon and Charmides, though he does contradict Diogenes Laërtius’
reconstruction of his family tree by calling Glaucon his uncle (tou= h9mete/rou qei/ou)
rather than his brother and Charmides his cousin (e0mo\n de\ a)netio/n) rather than nephew.74
That is a small quibble, however, which speaks less about the identity of this Critias than
the difficulty of establishing someone’s family tree centuries after their death, and the
Critias in the Charmides is clearly the same as in the Protagoras, i.e., the oligarch.
The Charmides is concerned with defining swfrosu/nh, or restraint.75 This is not
a concept one would conceive of Xenophon’s Critias as being at all interested in (recall
his lust for violence as well as his pig-like lust for Euthydemus), but the understanding
Critias apparently has of this virtue can actually be interpreted as characteristic of his
later actions. For when Charmides defines restraint as minding one’s own business (to\
ta_ e9autou= pra&ttein), Socrates recognizes this as a definition heard from Critias.76 Plato
(via Socrates) arrives at that very same definition (to\ ta_ au9tou= pra&ttein) as the
meaning of justice in the Republic77 and elaborates on what minding one’s own business
entails: “each man must make it his business [to do] one thing of those concerning the
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Ibid., 336e-337a.
Plat., Charm. 153c.
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city, that thing for which his nature is most suited” (o3ti e3na e3kaston e4n de/oi
e0pithdeu/ein tw~n peri\ th\n po/linm ei0j o3 au0tou= h9 fu/sij e0pithdeista&th pefukui=a
ei1h).78 It follows that if Critias saw overthrowing the democracy, betraying Athens, and
killing indiscriminately to be fulfilling his natural predisposition, then he might very well
have considered his actions to be exemplary of both swfrosu/nh and justice, at least as
defined by himself (and later his cousin/great-nephew).
Though Critias quickly and emphatically denies being the source of this definition
of restraint—“Certainly not from me!” (ou0 ga_r dh\ e0mou= ge)79— Charmides seems to
confirm Socrates’ suspicions by laughing and looking at Critias after saying that the man
he heard it from might not have even known what he was talking about, intending,
according to Socrates, to goad Critias into taking up the discussion in his place.80 It
works, and a hint of the future tyrant bleeds through when Critias ironically shows a lack
of the very restraint they are discussing by growing angry (o0rgisqh=nai) at Charmides.81
In the same way the Critias of Xenophon and Philostratus is visible in Critias’ quick
temper here, the prideful Critias of his own writings82 appears soon after. When he does
not understand what Socrates is asking him, Critias is ashamed at his failure to live up to
his distinguished aristocratic reputation, so he tries to conceal his a)pori/a83 to “save
face,” as it were.84
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More contentious is the identity of Critias in the Timaeus and Critias. In antiquity,
there appears to have been little doubt that this Critias was the tyrant.85 This view
prevailed until the early twentieth century, when the character was instead identified as
the grandfather of that Critias.86 There has been no definitive resolution of this
uncertainty, which arose because the grandfather-Critias that the speaker-Critias refers to
could not have known Solon if the speaker-Critias is indeed Critias of the Thirty, whereas
if the speaker-Critias is actually the grandfather of the tyrant Critias, the grandfatherCritias (now the great-grandfather of Critias the tyrant) could have been a contemporary
of Solon.87 Many scholars have thus supported the identification of the speaker-Critias as
the grandfather of Critias the oligarch,88 but others maintain that the speaker-Critias is the
oligarch himself.89 The latter position is my own; while it is true that Critias the tyrant’s
grandfather would probably not have heard Solon’s story of Atlantis directly from the
mouth of Solon, Critias never claims that he did. Instead, Critias reports that Solon told
the tale to “his kinsman and very dear friend Great-Grandpa Dropides” (oi0kei=oj kai\
sfo&dra pi/loj h9mi=n Drwpi/dou propa&ppou), who then told Grandpa Critias, who in
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turn told Critias himself.90 Perhaps it is still a stretch for there to be so few generations
between Critias the tyrant and Dropides91—maybe Plato skipped a generation or two for
simplicity’s sake92—but regardless I think it is clear that Plato intended the speakerCritias to be understood as the tyrant.
Having established that the Critias featured as an interlocutor in the Timaeus and
the Critias is indeed the tyrant, as in the Protagoras and the Charmides, let us consider
how he is portrayed in the former two dialogues. Socrates says of him, “We all know that
Critias is no amateur in anything that we are saying” (Kriti/an de/ pou pa&ntej oi9 th=de
i1smen ou0deno\j i0diw&thn o1nta w{n le/gomen),93 that is, Critias is not ignorant about what
makes an ideal city, which is what Socrates et al. had been discussing on the previous
day94 and reviewing at the beginning of this dialogue.95 Critias, then, is interested in and
capable of philosophizing about the political order, justice, human nature, and all the
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various other themes of the Republic. He is also skeptical (at the least) about the gods. It
is far easier to persuade people about the gods than about mortals, he says, since
“inexperience and excessive ignorance of those listening” (h9 ga_r a)peiri/a kai\ sfo/dra
a!gnoia tw~n a)kouo/ntwn) about certain matters enables someone to easily speak about
such things, “and we know how we feel about the gods” (peri\ de\ de\ qew~n i1smen w(j
e1xomen).96 In other words, Critias and at least one other participant in the conversation are
apparently ignorant about or unsure of the gods.
The Critias of Plato is as complex a character as the one portrayed by Xenophon
and Philostratus and revealed in Critias’ own works. Proud, a bit volatile, skeptical of the
gods, sometimes dishonest, aware of the power of speech to persuade, and an advocate
for “minding one’s own business” (read: following one’s nature), but at the same time an
apparently respected philosopher who is capable of moderation and recognized by
Socrates as well-versed in contemplating what the ideal city might look like, the Critias
that his younger, more fondly-remembered relative depicts is perhaps best described as
poiki/loj97—clever and skillful, yet exactly the kind of man Plato does not want in his
ideal city.98
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3.4 Critias in the Sisyphus Fragment
From the above accounts, it is clear that Critias had the literary texnh/99 and
philosophical inclination to have written the Sisyphus fragment. If we consider the
philosophical views implied in the fragment, it reveals itself to be in line with Critias’
character, even when leaving aside the atheism argument. In the fragment, Sisyphus
posits that some shrewd man invented the gods and introduced them to mortals in such a
way that men would especially fear them, so that men would refrain from doing evil in
secret. Essentially, the fragment describes the origin of religion as a form of social
control for the masses, “a kind of religious Panopticon” that ensures the obedience of the
citizenry by convincing them that the gods are always watching, that even their innermost
thoughts are subject to scrutiny from above.100 Critias had a vested interest in controlling
the citizenry (and even his fellow oligarchs) as one of the Thirty, and he was also “no
amateur” at thinking about the mechanisms that allow a city to function well; that he
might have put some thought into how one might go about ensuring the obedience of the
populace should not be surprising.
What is more, this lie is called h3diston101—literally, “most sweet,” but here it has
the sense of “beguiling,”102 like the words of Hesiod’s Muses, who “know how to speak
many false things like the truth” (i1dmen yeu/dea polla_ le/gein e0tu/moisin o9moi=a).103
More importantly, this beguiling lie is similar to the rhetoric of the Sophists, who
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famously were accused of seeking to make the weaker argument into the stronger. 104
Though Critias was not a Sophist in the strictest sense, as he did not travel around
teaching rhetoric and philosophy for pay—recall that Philostratus says he did not teach
rhetoric,105 and the scholiast on the Timaeus calls him an amateur among
philosophers106—he nevertheless had sophistic ideas and behaved in a manner consistent
with sophistic thought,107 to the point that Philostratus saw fit to include him in his Lives
of the Sophists. Further, Critias’ own awareness of the ease with which one can persuade
mortals about the gods is reflected in the fragment’s shrewd man, who does seem to
speak well about the gods to his audience and, additionally, does so by locating the gods
in the heavens, another area concerning which human knowledge was relatively uncertain
at the time.
Though the shrewd man referred to in the fragment is not shown to gain anything
from such a falsehood, and the imposition of religion is framed as a positive thing for
mankind, working in conjunction with laws to elevate humanity from its previous state of
beastly violence,108 there is some indication in the language used that this apparent
victory for justice is not as straightforward as it appears on the surface. In particular, I am
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referring to line 6, in which Sisyphus calls Justice a tyrant. The idea that justice is the
subjugation of others falls very much in line with the anti-democratic actions of the tyrant
Critias, who, as outlined previously, helped topple the Athenian democracy and later
circumvented the Council to ensure the death of his political opponent Theramenes. For
Critias, Theramenes’ death was justice because it eliminated a threat and increased his
own power—and this was achieved by acting in a tyrannical manner. Justice is a tyrant,
and the threat of punishment from the gods is “for the subject, to ensure his obedience,
not for the enlightened ruler.”109 Though the fragment’s shrewd man is not explicitly
depicted as ruling over his fellow man—he is not called a king, or a tyrant, or anything of
the sort—he does rule over them in that do what he wants (i.e., submit to the laws), and
he is also superior in the sense that he does not live in fear of the gods like the other
mortals do. Critias, once the Thirty were established, would have had nothing to fear
from violating the laws nor even from contradicting his fellow oligarchs;110 he also
seemed to have no certainty about the existence of the gods and no fear of divine
retribution for his actions,111 much like the speaker and shrewd man in the Sisyphus
fragment.
The portrait that Xenophon and Philostratus paint of Critias is an ambitious,
intelligent, but ultimately cutthroat man who acted without regard for the law, the gods,
or his fellow citizens. Critias’ own works, if we leave aside the Sisyphus fragment and
tragic trilogy for now, affirm his intelligence and suggest a more moderate, though
visibly pro-Spartan, thinker, as do Plato’s dialogues; both do, however, hint at the Critias
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of Xenophon and Philostratus. These many facets of Critias are exhibited in the Sisyphus
fragment, an atheistic and sophistic piece of literature concerned with the nature of
mankind, the origin of civilized society, and the nature’s superiority over the law.
Because the character of Critias is evident in the philosophical content of the fragment as
well as its existence (that is, its literary and intellectual nature is consistent with the
education and skill as an author that Critias possessed), the attribution to Critias by
Sextus Empiricus is well-supported. At the very least, even if Euripides wrote the
fragment, the degree to which the fragment is consistent with the character of Critias
suggests that he was likely entertaining some of the same ideas.
On a final note, against the objection that the views inherent in a piece of
literature do not necessarily match those of its author, especially when those views are
espoused by the villain of the piece, publicly expressing atheistic sentiments was risky in
fifth-century Athens and beyond. Anaxagoras, Euripides, Diagoras of Melos, and
Socrates were all tried for a)se/beia,112 or godlessness/impiety, not even necessarily
outright atheism.113 Putting these ideas about the fabrication of the gods to paper, then,
would have been very risky indeed, especially for a man like Critias who was going into
politics, as his opponents would have used it against him in the same way they tried him
for the mutilation of the herms (which he was acquitted of). But having Sisyphus, a
character punished in Tartarus for eternity, speak about the falsehood of the gods’
existence provides the perfect form of plausible deniability, as the author could claim he
was only making a case against atheism, portraying the full depravity of the character, or
112
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any other such argument. Indeed, recall that this is just what Aëtius claims was going on,
though he of course says the views were Euripides’.114 The fragment thus can be read as
a covert expression of Critias’ political philosophy and impiety and should be interpreted
as a justification for his actions and policies.
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CHAPTER IV
THE FRAGMENT IN CONTEXT

4.1 Solon
While the Sisyphus fragment is certainly an expression of many of Critias’ views
and should be interpreted as a justification for his tyranny, it was not written in a vacuum
and thus can be better understood in the context of other philosophical thought both
preceding and following the life of its author. Generations earlier, Critias’ ancestor Solon
wrote about a political order in many ways similar to that of the Sisyphus fragment, yet
strikingly different in regards to justice and the gods. 115 Solon fixates on “Good Order”
(Eu0nomi/h) as the foundation of lawfulness.116 That’s what makes a city and a government
good and allows Justice to flourish, for:
“Good Order renders all things orderly and fitting
and often puts fetters ‘round the unjust;
she smooths jagged things, puts an end to greed, dims hubris,
and wilts the sprouting bloom of madness,
and she straightens crooked judgments and softens proud
deeds, and she stops deeds of sedition,
and she stops the wrath of painful strife, and by her all is
fitting and prudent for mankind.”117
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fr.4W
Ibid.
117
Ibid., ln. 32-9: (Eu0nomi/h d’ eu1kosma kai\ a!rtia pa&nt’ a)pofai/nei / kai\ qama_ toi=j a)di/koij
a)mfiti/qhsi pe/daj: / traxe/a leia/nei, pau/ei ko/ron, u3brin a)mauroi=, / au0ai/nei d’ a!thj a!nqea
116
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Critias, too, values order in the Sisyphus fragment; the state of mankind that the speaker
negatively contrasts to his own, more civilized age is characterized by disorder. 118
Moreover, Solon’s Justice “knows what happens and what happened before” (su/noide ta_
gigno/mena pro/ t’ e0o/nta),119 functioning in much the same way as the Sisyphus
fragment’s invented divinities.
Despite these superficial similarities, the Sisyphus fragment provides an implicit
political theory opposite Solon’s. Solon’s Justice is just as omniscient as Critias’ invented
deities, but whereas she has “holy foundations” (semna_ Di/khj qe/meqla),120 the Justice
brought about by the laws and fear of the gods in the Sisyphus fragment is wholly a
product of human invention. Further, the Good Order associated with Solon’s Justice puts
an end to injustice firmly121 but gently,122 as opposed to Critias’ tyrannical Justice that
holds violence in check as her slave123 and rules through fear.124 Both the society
portrayed by Solon and the society portrayed by Critias have citizens who follow the law,
but Solon’s citizens do so out of a harmonious, moral impulse brought about by an actual
divinity—Good Order—while Critias’ citizens only obey out of a fear of punishment
brought about by the lies of a shrewd man and the all-encompassing tyranny of Justice,
which is subjugation, not symbiosis. Critias’ political order is thus better understood
when framed as a perversion of his ancestor Solon’s.
fuo/mena, / eu0qu/nei de\ di/kaj skolia_j u9perh/fana& t’ e1rga / prau5nei, pau/ei d’ e1rga dixostasi/hj, /
pau/ei d’ a)rgale/hj e1ridoj xo/lon, e1sti d’ u9p’ au0th=j / pa&nta kat’ a)nqrw&pouj a!rtia kai\ pinuta&).
118
DK 88 B25, a!taktoj (ln. 1) and th\n a)nomi/an (ln.40).
119
Solon, fr. 4W, ln. 15.
120
Ibid., ln. 14.
121
e.g., she chains the unjust, ibid., ln. 33.
122
e.g., “she smooths jagged things,” “dims hubris,” and “softens proud deeds,” ibid., ln. 34, 36-7.
123
DK 88 B25, ln. 6-7
124
Ibid., ln. 40.
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4.2 Thucydides
On the subject of the antithetical juxtaposition of Justice and tyranny found in the
Sisyphus fragment is the idea that altering the meaning of a word to the point that Critias
does by calling Justice a tyrant renders language itself meaningless. Thucydides, when
providing an account of the revolution of Corcyra, notes that one of the many deleterious
effects of said revolution was that “the customary meaning of words exchanged what is
right for the matters [they were applied to]” (kai\ th\n ei0wqui=an a)ci/wsin tw~n
o0noma&twn e0j ta_ e1rga a)nth/llacan th+| dikaiw&sei).125 Perhaps the revolution of the
Thirty hinged on redefining Justice as tyranny. As discussed previously, Critias seemed
to view restraint as following one’s own nature, which would mean subjugating others if
one’s nature was superior; it is hardly a stretch to imagine that he might have rationalized
overthrowing the democracy as taking back control from the tyranny of a Justice that
imposed itself on the natural state of man and prevented the strong from rightfully ruling
over the weak.

4.3 Plato
Plato says many things that are relevant to this fragment. Chief among them are
the persuasive power he ascribes to poetry and the famous “noble lie” he decides is
necessary to maintain justice in his city. It has already been established that Plato’s
definition of justice might have grown out of Critias’ definition of restraint (minding
125

Hist., 3.82.4.
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one’s own business); it is possible that a further similarity exists between Plato’s
philosopher-king and the shrewd man of Critias’ Sisyphus fragment. Each of these
“rulers” (again, the shrewd man is not explicitly shown to rule, but he is not subject to the
fear of the gods and thus is freer and more powerful than the people he deceives) controls
the narrative through a false myth.
The shrewd man of the Sisyphus fragment appear to persuade his audience in
much the same way that Plato describes poetry operating on those who hear it. For Plato,
a large part of the persuasive power of poetry lies in its ability to enchant the audience,
making them feel as if they are actually “among the deeds either in Ithaca or Troy or
wherever the epic is [set]” (para_ toi=j pra&gmasin…h2 e0n 0Iqa&kh ou]sin h2 o3pwj a@n kai\
ta_ e1ph e1xh).126 The listeners, “astounded by the things being said” (sunqambou=ntaj
toi=j legome/noij),127 are susceptible to the rhapsode or poet making them believe things
that are not actually true, much like the people who listen to the shrewd man’s sweet,
beguiling words in the Sisyphus fragment are especially astounded and believe his lie.
While the ideal city should treat the truth as invaluable, according to Plato,128 he
also says that “for the rulers of the city…it is fitting to lie…for the benefit of the city”
(toi=j a!rxousin dh\ th=j po/lewj…prosh/kei yeu/desqai…e3neka e0p’ w)feli/a| th=j
po/lewj).129 The Sisyphus fragment’s lie about the existence of the gods is presented as
beneficial for mortals, as it raises them one step higher above the animalistic existence
they lived in prior to the invention of the gods, preventing people from doing evil deeds
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Plato, Ion 535c.
Ibid., 535e.
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Rep., 389b: a)lla_ mh\n kai\ a)lh/qeia&n ge peri\ pollou= poihte/on.
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Ibid.
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in secret. According to the above Platonic criteria for the acceptability of a lie—that it
must be told by a ruler and provide some benefit for the city—the invention of the gods is
perfectly acceptable. It is consistent, too, with Plato’s assertion that a lie that prevents
wrongdoing is “useful” (krh/simon).130
Plato’s own ideal city has a parallel lie to the one told by the shrewd man in the
Sisyphus fragment. In the just city, all the citizens mind their own business,131 or do what
they are most suited for according to their nature.132 In order that each of Plato’s three
classes of citizens might be content with their lot and perform the duties that nature has
made them most suited for, “a contrivance of opportune lies” (mhxanh\...tw~n yeudw~n
tw~n e0n de/onti gignome/nwn) about their origins must be concocted and disseminated
among the citizenry133—this is the so-called “noble lie” that is necessary for justice to
prevail in Plato’s city. Just so, the political philosophy inherent in Critias’ Sisyphus
fragment claims that another “noble lie”—that divine retribution awaits any misdeed or
wayward thought—is necessary for the maintenance of justice. Therefore, despite the
vastly different perceptions of Critias and Plato, both today and in antiquity, the two seem
to have shared some philosophy as well as blood.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION

This is all to say that the question of the Sisyphus fragment’s attribution, though it
cannot be resolved for certain, is most likely answered by saying that Critias is the
author, and, furthermore, even if he is not, the fact that so many ancient and modern
sources believed him to be the author is more important than whether or not he actually
wrote the fragment. While Euripides was undoubtedly interested in exploring atheism and
other sophistic ideas, the philosophic implications of the fragment so align with Critias’
violent and self-serving actions as one of the Thirty Tyrants, and his own reputation for
atheism and sophistic rhetoric, that it is reasonable to take Sextus Empiricus’ attribution
as correct. At the very least, it follows that the similarity of thought between Critias and
the fragment—both products of fifth-century Athenian ideas—is significant enough that
this play is the sort of thing he might have written, and the man and the fragment are thus
inextricable. Therefore, the fragment should be interpreted as a philosophical justification
for the coup and subsequent tyrannical reign of Critias. Furthermore, taking Critias to be
the author of the Sisyphus fragment cements him as an important figure not only in
Athens’ political history but also in her philosophical history, as the ideas in the fragment
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benefit from being read as products of previous political philosophy as well as hints of
the direction that Plato ultimately takes his own philosophy.
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